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The language of coercion and compulsion entered the criminal law in 2015, with a new offence of “controlling and coercive behavior” and a new defence of “compulsion.” Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 (SCA), introduces the offence of “controlling and coercive behaviour” in an intimate or family relationship recognising the context, circumstances and tactics of domestic violence. Section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (MSA), recognises the element of “compulsion” in the commission of a criminal offence and provides a duress like defence for those who caught in trafficking and slavery commit criminal offences. In both instances the offence and defence will be very limited, “coercion” because matters of proof and an overly complex provision will make implementation difficult, and “compulsion” because of an attitude towards involuntarism, an overly narrow understanding of reasonable alternatives and a statutory limitation placed on the offences to which the defence can apply. Training and education are required for all statutory agencies and the judges and legal representatives with regard to the role of “coercion” in an intimate or family relationship, and with regard to the part played by a range of circumstances including impoverishment, destitution and juju witchcraft that makes trafficked victims so susceptible to slavery and “compulsion” to commit crimes.

Introduction
	Two very significant and ground breaking statutory provisions were introduced in 2015, one creating a new offence​[1]​ recognising “controlling and coercive behaviour” the other a new defence,​[2]​ recognising “compulsion” within the criminal law. 
	Under s. 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 (SCA), the range of criminal law offences has expanded to include a new offence of “controlling and coercive behaviour” albeit limited to an intimate or family relationship. This adds to the development of the law on assault by going beyond the punishment of physical or technical harm. It recognises that “controlling and coercive behaviour” are capable of causing harm and the special vulnerability of victims in family settings. The House of Lords in Burstow and Ireland​[3]​ in 1997 recognized that hate mail, telephone calls, offensive mail to neighbours and harassment occasioning  “an apprehension of immediate violence” as capable of constituting an offence under s. 20 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (OAPA) by inflicting bodily harm. Subsequently, the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (PFHA) s. 4, created an offence to address the menace of stalking and related behaviours where a course of conduct “caused another to fear, on at least two occasions, that violence would be used against that person.” These behaviours were not limited however to any particular relationship between the victim and suspect. The specific recognition of “coercion” as a harm warranting criminalisation arose in statutory form for first time as part of the background measures to tackle forced marriage. Section 121(1) of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, provides that a person commits an offence if s/he “uses violence, threats or any other form of coercion for the purpose of causing another person to enter into a marriage.”​[4]​ It is to be noted however that coercion within marriage provided a defence of marital coercion under the Criminal Justice Act 1925 s. 47 until its abolition (Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act  2014, s. 177).
	Under s. 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (MSA), evidence of “compulsion” may constitute a defence to certain offences committed by those so compelled in respect of s. 1 “Slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour” or s. 2 “Human trafficking” where it is attributable to  “slavery or relevant exploitation” (s.45(3)). The defence is extremely limited since s. 45 (7) expressly excludes offences listed in Schedule 4 of the Act. Approximately 130 offences, including theft and some drug related offences are excluded. 
	Each provision has been the subject of an article this year. Vanessa Bettinson​[5]​ contributed a succinct overview of the substantive provision criminalising coercive control in which she also examined Scottish law and a proposal that domestic abuse should be a specific offence. Karl Laird​[6]​ provided an incisive overview of the substantive defence of compulsion comparing its objective test requirements with the law on duress concluding that the new defence mirrors duress’s deficiencies particularly as trafficked victims may have difficulty in demonstrating fortitude or an ability to avoid the circumstances that compel them. 
Meanwhile, the common law defence of duress retains its high threshold of requiring a threat of immediate death or serious physical violence before it can be considered.​[7]​ However guidance from the Sentencing Guidance Council where duress fails does take into account “coercive, intimidatory and exploitative behaviour” at the sentencing stage in assessing culpability following s.125 (1) Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Whilst s. 55 (3) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 in accommodating “fear” as a sufficient ground to trigger a loss of self-control to afford a partial defence to murder sets a high standard of “serious” and also specifies the requirement of “violence” in so far as D’s loss of self-control must be attributable to D's “fear of serious violence” from V against D or another identified person.This article develops some of the themes discussed in those articles and in addition considers some of the conceptual, interpretive and practical issues posed for effective implementation and evaluates the limitations of both of these provisions.

Coercive and Controlling Behaviour 
	The creation of a specific stand-alone offence of coercion and a defence of compulsion, whilst coercion and compulsion is also recognized as part of a duress defence albeit with its more stringent requirements, is entirely unprecedented. The offence and defence will be problematic for investigators, prosecutors and fact finders, first, with regard to the meaning of “coercive and controlling behaviour” (s. 76 SCA) and “compulsion” (s. 45 MSA) which will depend on the case specific factual context​[8]​ and second, with regard to matters of proof concerning what particular behaviour amounts to coercion and what evidence is required to demonstrate that a person has been so compelled. 
Whilst relatively new to substantive criminal law “coercive and controlling behaviour”​[9]​   and “compulsion” has been considered for several decades especially in the psychological and criminological literature. Feminist jurisprudence has erstwhile focused on the role coercion, in its broadest sense, has played in abusive relationships as a particular and habituated feature in the experience of the domestic violence victim.​[10]​ Schechter describes domestic violence as characterised by “a pattern of coercive control that one person exercises over another. Abusers use physical and sexual violence, threats, emotional insults and economic deprivation as a way to dominate their partners and get their way.”​[11]​ Dalton and Schneider,​[12]​ Walker,​[13]​ and Horley​[14]​ for example, have identified coercive and controlling behavior as an integral characteristic of domestic abuse. Ellen Pence in Duluth in the 1980s identified coercion as a key aspect of the communality of core tactics used by abusers to maintain control.​[15]​

Storytelling and legal relevance
	Despite the presence in life experience of control and coercion in domestic violence, coercion and control has not been part of the legal lexicon of storytelling in the court room. By the time allegations of domestic violence are presented in court the background context of power, control, coercion, compulsion, and mental intimidation has been filtered out as legally irrelevant or minimised. Of relevance are episodes of physical violence and evidence of threats of violence. The case for the prosecution is built and argued upon legal relevances and through the careful inclusion of facts that strongly support the case and the exclusion of extraneous facts and matters that weaken it​[16]​ Law translates at least some of ordinary life into legal language.​[17]​  Law shapes the social reality such that victims stories of intimidation, coercion and control are  met with the response, “Yes, yes, but did he hit you?” and thus women come to learn not to talk  in court about nonphysical forms of coercion and control and to understand that it is only physical conduct that is significant. Kuennen observes, “Without attention to the batterer’s use of coercion-pressure, influence, or threat of force to the degree that these tactics interfere with a victim’s volition courts hear only parts of victims’ stories.”​[18]​ 
	The linguistic formulation of legal wrongs, in turn manages and organizes how we speak of, and how wrongs are imagined, thus  excluding certain experiences from the law’s narrative. Victims of domestic violence then have been left to fit only those experiences of harm which are recognised in the established legal framework into their formal accounts of harm. 
This disconnect between life and substantive law leads feminists critical of legal form to ask why the social experience of women so often acquires little or no legal status.​[19]​ Part of feminist lawmaking has been to critique the rules of law, evidence and proof, and the construction of offences, exploring the conduct that is deemed criminal, the excluded conduct that is not, and the gendering inherent in schema of the legal form and legal relevance.​[20]​ As Spelman observes, “One of the most pressing tasks for the feminist legal critique is an analysis of legal rules and the implications of relevance, inclusions and exclusions for the female subject.”​[21]​  Lacey, for example, is particularly interested in the exclusion of shame, humiliation, objectification and exploitation from the legal framework.​[22]​ Specifically with regard to coercion, Bettinson, observes “Unfortunately, criminal law frameworks struggle to capture the real nature of this harm. Instead the focus is on isolated physical injuries that can be seen where context is disregarded.”​[23]​ 
However, coercion has had a place in the factual matrix and case building in non-molestation injunctions where evidence of molestation is legally relevant, but even here courts have tended to find more persuasive evidence of physical violence in considering whether to grant an injunction.​[24]​ The matrimonial courts in divorce cases, in the past when conduct was relevant or petitions contested, heard evidence of coercive behavior. As an example, Madhav Sharma and Jenny Seagrove divorced in 1988.  Judge Clive Callman was reported as saying of Sharma,​[25]​ “he set about vicariously to fulfil his personal need for success, standing and recognition, not only as the husband but the controller and dominator of the professional and personal life of a talented and rising star …he helped his wife professionally until he began to interfere excessively and unreasonably with her professional life …He knew her emotional weaknesses and exploited them. To fulfil his own needs he sapped Miss Seagrove’s self-confidence and self-esteem through undue criticism and reduced her systematically to a state of complete emotional dependence.”

Coercion in treatment programmes
	Coercion has also been a relevant consideration in the management of male violence. Where it is considered a risk factor in Multi Agency Risk Assessment Conference (MARAC)​[26]​ assessments. In addition, treatment programmes for abusive partners in Duluth, US, through the work of Ellen Pence,​[27]​ and in the UK’s several domestic violence intervention projects (DVIP’s) have focused on challenging the coercive tactics men use in abusive relationships in making domestic violence perpetrators accountable. 
Evidence of coercion is also a factor acknowledged by the CPS as influencing their decision to continue with a prosecution especially where victims have been placed under pressure by the defendant or other family members to withdraw their support for a prosecution. In its most recent guidance the CPS asserts, “Prosecutors should ensure they are familiar with the Government definition of domestic abuse and the impacts and dynamics of how abuse may be perpetrated…There is no specific statutory offence of domestic violence and/ or abuse-it is a general term describing a range of controlling and coercive behaviors…”.​[28]​ 
	The development of “no drop” prosecution policies in the US and UK has resulted from an understanding of how coercive tactics are used by abusers to compel victims to withdraw allegations.​[29]​ Developments in the field of evidence, notably the Criminal Justice Act 1988 s. 23 (3)(b) now provided in the Criminal Justice Act (CJA)2003 s. 116 (2)(e), permit the use of witness statements in court in place of oral testimony where the witness is in fear and may be subject to coercive tactics. Section 116 (3) establishes “For the purposes of subsection (2) (e) “fear” is to be widely construed and (for example) includes fear of the death or injury of another person or of financial loss.” Significantly, s. 116 (4) (b) of the 2003 Act requires the judge to consider in respect of considering to admit documentary hearsay “any risk that its admission or exclusion will result in unfairness to any party to the proceedings (and in particular to how difficult it will be to challenge the statement if the relevant person does not give oral evidence).”​[30]​ It is suggested that  it is a little used section in domestic violence cases​[31]​ which is certainly indicated by the very few appealed cases challenging  admissibility compared with a significant number  relating to gang violence, murder, burglary and drug related crimes 
Developments in the admissibility of res gestae evidence in domestic violence cases is also to be noted with regard to admissibility of  999 emergency calls in applying s. 118 (4)(a) CJA provided always  that it is  “made by a person so emotionally overpowered by an event that the possibility of concoction or distortion can be disregarded.”  In the case of Barnaby v Director of Public Prosecutions​[32]​ the victim made three 999 calls to the emergency services, and reported to the police attending the scene that the defendant had tried to strangle her, the Court of Appeal held that the evidence of the telephone calls had been properly admitted. Further, in Ibrahim v Crown Prosecution Service,​[33]​ an Appeal by way of case stated, the court  found that the judge had not acted unreasonably in admitting evidence of telephone calls  to the emergency services as res gestae evidence made by the victim complaining of a domestic violence assault.​[34]​




Women the coerced subject -The impact of his coercion on her mens rea
Until the introduction of this new  s.76  SCA provision, coercion has been considered less with regard to the coercers conduct and responsibility for his action and more with regard to constructing the effects of his coercion on the mental state of the battered victim who in turn kills her abuser/coercer. Coercion in its various forms has been relevant to framing a defence argument for battered women who kill their abusers and in understanding and constructing the battered woman’s psychological profile of despair and helplessness (formerly in constructing a defence of diminished responsibility or provocation - Homicide Act 1957 ss 2.3, and more recently in constructing loss of self-control - Coroners and Justice Act 2009 s. 55 (3)).  Her impairment, instead of his violent and coercive behaviour, has been the focus of legal relevance and women’s experiences have been moulded into the pre-existing legal framework especially of diminished responsibility. For example, in the trial of Kiranjit Ahluwalia​[35]​ for the murder of her husband Deepak, together with evidence of his physical violence his coercive control over her was also adduced as part of case building her defence of diminished responsibility. In her effort to placate him she had written a note to him which Lord Taylor (LCJ) in the Court of Appeal referred to in these telling terms: 
The state of humiliation and loss of self-esteem to which the deceased's behavior over the ten years of the marriage had reduced her is evidenced by a letter she wrote him after he left her for three days about April 1989.  ‘Deepak, if you come back I promise you - I won’t touch black coffee again, I won’t go town every week, I won’t eat green chilli, I ready to leave Chandikah and all my friends, I won’t go near Der Goodie Mohan’s house again, Even I am not going to attend Bully’s wedding, I eat too much or all the time so I can get fat, I won’t laugh if you don’t like, I won’t dye my hair even, I don’t go to my neighbour’s house, I won’t ask you for any help.’​[36]​

Similarly, in the trial of Joel Steinberg​[37]​ (who was convicted of the manslaughter of his seven year old adopted daughter, Lisa) evidence adduced by the prosecution was admitted to demonstrate the impact of coercion on the psychological in/ability of Hedda Nussbaum (Steinberg’s partner) to protect their adopted daughter. As Nussbaum was called as a witness for the prosecution, no charges were brought against her. Hedda Nussbaum, suffered physical injuries caused by Steinberg including broken bones, bruising and the need for a splenectomy. As to evidence of his controlling and coercive behaviour significantly she said in her evidence that she bathed when Joel said she could, she ate when Joel said she could, and she went to the bathroom when Joel said she could.​[38]​
During the last decade prosecutors, police and lawmakers have argued especially through the work of Evan Stark,​[39]​ for an alternative framework emphasizing the batterer’s pattern of coercion and control rather than the effects of his acts on victim psychology and state of mind.  It is this new imagining and rethinking that has informed the creation of the new offence of s.76. In addition, in circumstances of trafficking and exploitation victims are also kept in fear through multiple intimidations and coercion and compulsion not only through threats of actual physical violence.

The Coercion Offence – The Serious Crime Act
Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015​[40]​ sets out a number of requirements in order that the offence be satisfied. The “controlling or coercive” behavior must be repeated or continuous; A and B must be personally connected; the behavior must have a serious effect on B and A knows or ought to know that the behavior will have a serious effect on B. “Serious effect” is defined as causing a person to fear violence of at least two occasions or having an adverse effect on day to day activities.

The actus reus of coercion
The guidelines for prosecutors set out the ambit of coercive behaviour including but not being limited to, psychological, physical, sexual, financial and emotional conduct.​[41]​ The cross-government definition of domestic violence in 2013 had already included coercive behaviour in its definition.​[42]​ CPS guidance on s. 76​[43]​ includes: 
any incident or pattern of incidents of controlling, coercive, threatening behaviour, violence or abuse between those aged 16 or over who are, …Controlling behaviour is a range of acts designed to make a person subordinate and/or dependent by isolating them from sources of support, exploiting their resources and capacities for personal gain, depriving them of the means needed for independence, resistance and escape and regulating their everyday behaviour [including] threats, humiliation and intimidation or other abuse that is used to harm, punish, or frighten their victim. 

Statutory guidance for police and criminal justice agencies​[44]​ published by the Home Office in December 2015 cited further examples of coercion, inter alia:
 …monitoring time; via online communication tools or using spyware;  taking control over aspects of their everyday life, such as where they can go, who they can see, what to wear and when they can sleep, access to transport and to work, depriving them of access to support services, such as specialist support or medical services; repeatedly putting them down such as telling them they are worthless; enforcing rules and activity which humiliate, degrade or dehumanise the victim;  forcing the victim to take part in criminal activity such as shoplifting, neglect or abuse of children to encourage self-blame and prevent disclosure to authorities;  financial abuse including control of finances, such as only allowing a person a punitive allowance; threats to hurt or kill; threats to a child;  threats to reveal or publish private information (e.g. threatening to ‘out’ someone)…  assault; criminal damage (such as destruction of household goods); rape.[Emphasis added]

Note that while the coercer may be prosecuted for coercing her into committing criminal offences, evidence of his coercion would not be sufficient to establish a defence under the common law of duress and such criminal offences as are highlighted above are specifically excluded from the defence of compulsion under the Modern Slavery Act s. 76. Domestic relationships are also excluded albeit that the statutory guidance recognises that a trafficker may present himself as a ‘boyfriend’ for example in a sexual exploitation case.​[45]​

 
Problems of proof
	It is for the prosecution to prove that the behaviour is “repeated or continuous.” So a number of similar or different acts separated in time, or a continuous act over a period of time will suffice. Section 76 (4)(a) sets out that either “the victim must fear that violence will be used against them on “at least two occasions”, or (b) they have been caused serious alarm or distress which has a substantial adverse effect on the victim’s usual day-to-day activities.” The meaning of “serious alarm or distress” and “substantial adverse effects”   will both require interpretation by the court. 
Whilst the purpose of the provision is to punish the defendant’s controlling or coercive behaviour, s.76 (4) (a) shifts the centre of proof away from the actus reus of his coercive behaviour (and here comes the casuistic twist) onto whether the victim fears, not controlling and coercive behaviour in all its forms as described above but actual  violence. In addition, the “fear of violence test” is conjoined with the “two occasions” requirement. So if the victim of coercion fears exposure, ruin, reputational damage, destitution etc., but not violence, s/he will fall outside the fear of violence test and fall within s.76 (4) (b) which will require proof of “serious alarm or distress” which has “a substantial adverse effect” on day to day activities. Proving each of these elements will require medical and psychological evidence as to, for example, sleeplessness, anxiety, depression etc. The impact of which will need to be “substantial”.  An impact on “day to day activities” suggests a serious impairment of functioning including evidence for example of days taken away from work because of stress.

Mens rea
	As to the mens rea the test is an objective one and it is for the prosecution to prove that the defendant “knows or ought to know” that the behaviour was coercive or controlling. The defendant will claim that s/he did not realise that his or her behaviour was coercive or controlling. Whilst the objective requirement will go some way towards rebutting a defendants contention that he did not realise that his conduct was coercive, it will be a matter for a magistrate or a jury to determine whether the behavior was coercive and whether the defendant ought to have so realised. Even with the obvious benefit of an “ought to know” test it is likely that the magistrate or jury will draw on their own experience and decide on the basis of what “they think” even though directed that the test is what the “reasonable person” thinks amounts to coercion. Magistrates and judges will require training,​[46]​ the jury will have directions from the judge. It is anticipated that there will be a universal failure to recognise coercion​[47]​ unless in its grossest form. 
Subsection (8) of s.76 SCA ‘In proceedings for an offence under this section it is a defence for A to show that— 
(a)in engaging in the behaviour in question, A believed that he or she was acting in B’s best interests, and 
(b)the behaviour was in all the circumstances reasonable’ 
will further undermine the provision  as it provides a defence where the defendant believes he or she was “acting in the best interests of the victim” and can show that in the particular circumstances their behavior was under the circumstances “objectively reasonable.”  The s.76 (8) defence is not available where the victim fears violence -s .76(10). Bettinson is rightly concerned and alarmed with the “best interests defence” and its potential for manipulation.​[48]​ She warns: “Any discrete offence seeking to address the coercive controlling behaviour and the harm it causes must not be used as a replacement for all incidents of domestic violence as there are different forms (Kelly and Johnson: 2008). Where possible the prosecution should continue to bring charges for incidents of physical violence where it satisfies the Full Code Test.”​[49]​ 
This loophole may be vigorously exploited by defendants. Masculinist gendered tropes of paternalism and protectionism will inevitably come to the fore (as men who will largely be the coercers and women largely the victims) will be rehearsed in the courtroom.  “Central to the logic of masculinist protection is the subordinate relation of those in the protected position. In return for male protection the woman concedes critical distance from decision-making autonomy.” ​[50]​ Thus, masculinist power is construed as a paternalistic and pastoral and not as a dominative or coercive. Embodied in a protectionist narrative exculpatory accounts will focus on the man as the responsible, virtuous protector and women as fickle, vulnerable, irrational, weak, in need of protection etc.  This begs the question as to how frequently conduct when presented by the prosecution as coercive may be reframed as well-meaning protection and objectively reasonable by the defence. Charles Saatchi’s explanation that he grabbed Nigella Lawson around the neck because he was trying “to get her to focus” ​[51]​ may not pass as objectively reasonable. It is hoped that magistrates and judges in interpreting the requirements will resist the ways in which this provision might be defeated. However its inclusion in the legislation demonstrates an ambivalent understanding of coercion in intimate and family relationships.  

The Defence of Compulsion
	Recognition of the role compulsion (involuntariness) plays in a situation of human trafficking and slavery has resulted in the creation of the new bespoke defence of s. 45 of the Modern Slavery Act (MSA) 2015.​[52]​ The existing common law defence of duress provides a complete defence, where there is a threat of death or serious injury, to all crimes excepting murder and attempted murder it is premised on the understanding that a crime committed under duress robs the defendant of voluntarism The decision of the House of Lords in Hasan,​[53]​ whilst restating the law that voluntary exposure to the threat precludes the defence being available, limited the defence in two significant ways. First, the threat must be reasonable and not subjectively assessed and second, the threat of death or serious injury must be capable of being carried out immediately (in fact) effectively overturning the ruling in Hudson and Taylor.​[54]​  Baroness Hale (obiter) raised her concern that women victims made vulnerable to duress because of gender based violence and coercion might be adversely affected by the defence as it stood.​[55]​  “[77] The battered wife knows very well that she may be compelled to cook the dinner, wash the dishes, iron the shirts and submit to sexual intercourse. That should not deprive her of the defence of duress if she is obliged by the same threats to herself or her children to commit perjury or shoplift for food …”​[56]​ 
	The defence of duress in the context of an intimate relationship was argued in the case of Coats.​[57]​ The Court of Appeal (Lady Justice Hallett) established as a general principle that “battered woman syndrome” (BWS) could be included as a characteristic of the reasonable “person” of duress. However, she set the bar for inclusion of this characteristic at a very high level. She said that an accused would need to be “suffering from BWS in a severe form” to claim that their will was overborne to the level of “total domination.” In the case of Coats the defendant’s evidence of suffering the effects of BWS failed to come up to the high level required, she also failed to fit the template considered typical of a battered woman. Coats did not conform to the stereotype, about whom it was said that she was not “passive” and was a woman “with her own anger management problems, … prepared to stand up for herself with W and the authorities and who, far from being isolated, was in regular contact with friends and relations.”​[58]​ 


The slavery/ exploitation compulsion defence - what is it?
Section 45 MSA provides a defence “… for slavery or trafficking victims who commit an offence (s. 45 (1) (b)) because the person is “compelled” to do it, and (c) the compulsion is attributable to slavery or to relevant exploitation.  
Compulsion (being compelled) is recognised in Article 26 of the Council of Europe, Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings 2005​[59]​  (developing the Palermo protocol of 2000).​[60]​ Article 26 “Non-punishment provision” provides “Each Party shall, in accordance with the basic principles of its legal system, provide for the possibility of not imposing penalties on victims for their involvement in unlawful activities, to the extent that they have been compelled to do so.” Article 8 of Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims,​[61]​ replicates the term in further establishing that being “compelled” can be a defence in circumstances of trafficking. “Member States shall, in accordance with the basic principles of their legal systems, take the necessary measures to ensure that competent national authorities are entitled not to prosecute or impose penalties on victims of trafficking in human beings for their involvement in criminal activities which they have been compelled to commit as a direct consequence of being subjected to any of the acts referred to in Article 2.”​[62]​[Emphasis added]
Lord Bates in the House of Lords in the First reading of the Bill sets out the scale of the trafficking and slavery problem. “The Modern Slavery Strategy sets out that in 2013 there were 226 convictions. However, the scale of the problem is much greater than that. Professor Bernard Silverman, the chief scientific adviser at the Home Office, estimates that the number of victims is more like 10,000 to 13,000.”​[63]​ In 2012, 2,255 potential victims of human trafficking were officially recorded.​[64]​  Of those 1,186 were referred to the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) (the framework set up by the Government in 2009 for identifying victims of human trafficking and ensuring they receive the appropriate protection and support).​[65]​ Of these, 786 were females, 400 were males (815 adults and 371 children).​[66]​ Approximately 340 cases have been referred to the CPS between January 2015 and June 2016 concerning trafficking and exploitation. Approximately 215 suspects have been charged and convictions secured in approximately 75% of cases.​[67]​

The new s. 45 MSA defence of compulsion is not available for all offences committed in the course of (s.1) slavery and (s.2) trafficking. It narrows the provision implicit in the Directive which extends to “involvement in criminal activities.” Until this new provision a victim of trafficking compelled to commit a criminal offence relied on the discretion of the CPS and/or the courts​[68]​  “the national authorities” in their implementation of Article 26 Non-Punishment provision. As will become apparent in the cases considered below the application of Article 26 has been inconsistent and haphazard and whilst the Court of Appeal has issued guidance for its interpretation, the new statutory defence under s.45 cannot address or remedy this inconstancy for those cases excluded by Schedule 4. 

The compulsion defence - who can rely on it?
As Laird​[69]​ points out the defence is limited in that compulsion must be attributable to slavery or to relevant exploitation, and is predicated on the reasonable person having no realistic alternative but to do the act. Furthermore, the defence is not available for offences including amongst others,  perverting the course of justice, assault, possession of a firearm, s. 9  Theft Act 1968 burglary, unlawful damage, s. 8 Theft Act (robbery or assault with intent to rob), an offence under s. 25 of the Immigration Act 1971 (assisting unlawful immigration to member state), an offence under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and an offence under s. 57  Terrorism Act 2000 (possession of article for terrorist purposes). Clearly, the legislators have not understood that pressures that can be brought to bear on victim/offenders caught in slavery and trafficking regardless of any particular  criminal offence which they may be compelled to commit. Laird points out that such exclusion “has the potential to undermine the effectiveness of the defence.”​[70]​ Parliament it would seem intended that the defence should be available for a far wider range of offences. Theresa May MP (Home Secretary at the time) in introducing the Bill in its First reading in the Commons said, “The Bill includes a statutory defence that an individual who has been coerced into committing a crime will be able to rely on, except for certain very serious crimes that will be excluded.”​[71]​ During its Second reading she recognised that, “Victims of modern slavery are sometimes forced by organised criminals to commit crimes such as cannabis cultivation.”​[72]​.Concern with the restrictions on the defence was voiced by Lord Tunnicliffe in the Second Reading of the Bill in the Lords. “We need to see how the defences work out, and whether any of the exceptions prove to be unfair to a victim. If they prove to be unfair, and the victim faces prosecution when the offence was directly the result of slavery, this will need to be revisited.”​[73]​  
It can hardly be the case that the coerced victim/defendant has any control over the particular offences s/he is compelled to commit, or can be expected to develop a more robust resistance or greater fortitude when being compelled to commit one of the crimes excluded in Schedule 4.  The exclusion of terrorist related offences for example is interesting and whilst the Family courts​[74]​ have found that young people may be coerced, groomed, and recruited into terrorist activity by terrorist gangs, for example in travelling abroad  to Syria, the MSA specifically excludes such circumstances. The exclusion of some theft offences is also particularly remiss. There is much evidence that in respect of the circumstances of cannabis cultivation and theft offences, slavery and human trafficking is very much in evidence. Regarding cannabis cultivation, in the period 1st January 2011 to 31st December 2013, a FOI request to all police forces in the UK found that there were 3,992 foreign nationals arrested for offences relating to cultivation of cannabis (s. 4 (2) and s. 6 (2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971).​[75]​ With regard to theft, including, pick pocketing, dipping, and begging, data gathered through FOI requests to UK police forces found of responses received, that of a total of 53,110 arrests of foreign nationals under s. 1 of the Theft Act 1968, Romanian nationals accounted for 28.9%.​[76]​ 
Significantly, the limits on the statutory defence fall short of the EU Directive (2011/36) which included a wider definition of trafficking to cover trafficking for forced criminal activities and forced begging.​[77]​ Section 31 of the Trinidad and Tobago TIP Act for example provides an absolute defence.
Out of the 2,255 potential victims of trafficking identified in the 2012 baseline assessment undertaken by the UK Human Trafficking Centre, 362 (16%) were victims of forced criminality. The two most common activities for which victims were exploited was forced labour in cannabis cultivation, petty crime and begging “…if we start with a defence which requires consulting multiple pages to establish which offences it is not available for, is impractical to say the least.”​[78]​ Furthermore, conspiring to facilitate unlawful immigration to a Member state, section 1(1) Criminal Law Act 1977 whilst excluded is a part of the trafficking compulsion fabric.​[79]​


What behaviour might amount to compulsion?
	Whilst examples of the kind of behaviour which might constitute compulsion is provided in the Victims of Modern Slavery Competent Authority Guidance​[80]​ (2016) unhelpfully  the words “compulsion”,  “compel” or “compelled”   never appear in the document although there is reference to “compulsory labour”. It is “coercion” that appears throughout. It is suggested that the meaning of “compelled” under s. 45 (1) (b) MSA is deliberately wide, embracing force, pressure, coercion and “being ‘obliged’” involving circumstances of blackmail, witchcraft or ritual oaths, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or vulnerability, forcing someone to pay an excessive amount of money for substandard accommodation ,making significant deductions from an individual’s ‘salary’, threats of rejection from, or disapproval by, a peer group, family, grooming - where vulnerable individuals are enticed over time to take part in activity in which they may not be entirely willing participants (for example, a trafficker may present themselves as a ‘boyfriend’ in a sexual exploitation case).​[81]​ Forced criminality is also set out in the guidance as “the exploitation of a person to commit:  pick-pocketing, shop-lifting, drug cultivation, other similar activities which are subject to penalties and imply financial gain.” Yet some offences are expressly excluded from the Act.​[82]​ For those offences excluded from the defence, it is surmised that the Competent Authority Guidance will inform the basis upon which the police may decide to prefer charges and/or guide the CPS in exercising discretion to prosecute in accordance with their obligations under Article 26. Theresa May MP concluded her presentation of the Second Reading of the Bill with an overly confident note that prosecutorial discretion would act as a full proof safeguard. “However, even in cases where the defence does not apply, prosecutors will still need to look carefully at all the circumstances to see whether it is in the public interest to prosecute victims.”​[83]​

The Article 26 safety net
Will Article 26 the “Non- punishment” provision, of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings 2005 (ratified in 2008 and entered into force on 1 April 2009), serve as a full proof safety net for those victims of trafficking who fall outside the s.45 MSA defence? And is the defence needed if Article 26 is properly applied?  
In the past police, prosecutors, advocates and the courts have not understood, nor applied it consistently, nor “applied their minds”​[84]​ to the possibility of trafficking in enacting this provision.  The case of R v O [2008],​[85]​  involved a victim of trafficking for sexual exploitation and is illustrative of the failings of national authorities, prosecutors and defence counsel. O, a Nigerian national of seventeen years of age, following her arrest on board a coach leaving the United Kingdom for France, pleaded guilty to an offence of possessing a false identity card (now s. 4 Identity Documents Act 2010). She stated that she had come to England with her boyfriend to escape from her father, who had threatened to kill her. Once in the UK she was prostituted in order to pay the debt she owed for the transportation. At her trial the issue of trafficking was not raised.  She was convicted and sentenced to 8 months’ imprisonment. However, prior to the trial an Attendance Note recorded that she had been seen by the Poppy project who concluded that she had been trafficked and threatened by a witchdoctor. Because of fear she had not mentioned these facts to counsel or her solicitor. Counsel did not raise these matters because he said he had not “been instructed” to do so. The Court of Appeal said that the original trial revealed a “shameful set of circumstances”​[86]​ and no proper steps were taken to ascertain whether she had been the victim of trafficking. Laws LJ said:  
[26] This appeal against conviction must obviously be allowed. We would put it most simply on the footing that the common law and art 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights alike require far higher standards of procedural protection than were given here. There was no fair trial. We hope that such a shameful set of circumstances never occurs again. Prosecutors must be aware of the protocols which, although not in the text books are enshrined in their Code. Defence lawyers must respond by making enquiries, if there is before them credible material showing that they have a client who might have been the victim of trafficking, especially a young client. Where there is doubt about the age of a Defendant who is a possible victim of trafficking, proper inquiries must be made, indeed statute so required. All this is obvious.

The Court of Appeal iterates the three options 
The Court of Appeal has since laid down guidance for the implementation of Article 26. In LM, MB, DG, BT, YT v The Queen [2010]​[87]​ the Court of Appeal heard five cases in which the defendants were, or had been, victims of human trafficking. LM, DG and MB (case No 1) were found in brothels and convicted of offences of controlling prostitution. It was noted that the “CPS pre-charging note recorded that although none had asserted it, ‘the police believe that they were probably trafficked into the UK themselves.’” Nonetheless, the Crown went ahead because it said that the defendants had threatened and abused others to secure their compliance. Just before the trial but when no jury had yet been sworn, the Crown accepted pleas of guilt on the basis that the defendants had not threatened or coerced others but had been beaten and coerced into prostitution themselves. They were not referred to any agency, nor was abandonment of the prosecution considered when the new factual basis was accepted. The Court of Appeal in quashing the conviction said “[30] At that stage it is plain that no-one on behalf of the Crown applied their mind to the question whether in the changed circumstances there was a public interest in continuing prosecution...[34] The reason why this appeal must be allowed is…because the art.26 duty was simply ignored at the point where the factual basis changed, and if it had been discharged it could have produced only one answer.” 
	In the second case and third case the appeals were disallowed as evidence of trafficking was not credible. The Court of Appeal, per Lord Justice Hughes in setting down guidance on the implementation of Article 26 in trafficking cases said. “[7] In England and Wales the implementation of Article 26 is achieved through three mechanisms.” First, there may be a defence of “duress of circumstance”, second, where there is evidence of trafficking the CPS may decide not to prefer charges, and third where cases reach the court stage an application for staying a prosecution (abuse of process) can be made.” Adding that   the power “to stay” should be used sparingly and applies if an exercise of judgment under the Convention is not properly carried out. 
However, the case of LL, HVN, THN, T v R, The Children's Commissioner for England, Equality and Human Rights Commission (R v L & Others [2013]​[88]​ continued to show that legal representatives and the authorities were failing in applying Article 26. This case involved four unconnected defendants (three adolescents were trafficked to work in cannabis farms and one adult trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation). The Court of Appeal whilst reiterating that no blanket immunity can be offered for those who are victims of trafficking​[89]​  said that in considering an application of abuse of process in reviewing the CPS decision to prosecute, the traditional Wednesbury grounds would not operate and the court would reach its own decision on the material and evidence advanced before it. In allowing the appeals the Court concluded: 
[33] We cannot be prescriptive. In some cases the facts will indeed show that he was under levels of compulsion which mean that in reality culpability was extinguished. If so when such cases are prosecuted an abuse of process submission is likely to succeed.​[90]​
THN (nearly seventeen) pleaded guilty to producing a controlled drug. The appellant’s solicitors wrote to the CPS inviting them not to prosecute on the basis that to do so would contravene the CPS Guidance relating to the prosecution of victims of trafficking. There had been evidence of debt bondage and errors in the approach of the UKBA. At the PCMH hearings the case was adjourned for further inquiries. Later, counsel for the appellant indicated that there would be an application to stay the indictment as an abuse of process. However, no abuse of process application was ever pursued. In the case of T the Court of Appeal noted “[54] … until after conviction no proper consideration was given to the question whether the appellant had been the victim of trafficking”. In HVN no interpreter was present, an application to have the case heard in a youth court was refused, when the UKBA made a reasonable grounds decision that HVN may indeed have been the victim of trafficking this was not communicated either to the prosecution or to the defence and on sentencing no one knew of the UKBA decision. The grounds of appeal revealed a lack of understanding of trafficking. All appeals were allowed. In the case of the woman, L, the Court concluded that she was victim of sexual exploitation and trafficking and that no attempt was made to use the NRM… Whilst in prison the Poppy project met with her and concluded that she was a victim of international trafficking for sexual exploitation in forced prostitution. The Crown conceded that if the actual facts had been known at the time when the decision to prosecute had been made, the case would not have proceeded  This appeal was also allowed.The handling of all these cases revealed a lack of understanding of trafficking and a catalogue of failures by those tasked with representing them.
The case of R v C (HB) and ors [2014]​[91]​ appeals against conviction and/or sentence demonstrate that in the absence of information on trafficking the appeal mechanism is the only redress open to convicted defendants. In this case all four women were sexual exploited for the purpose of prostitution. Held in debt bondage and terrorised by juju curses they were trafficked from Africa to the UK and then on to Europe. C, I, and F were apprehended on a flight to Paris with forged passports contrary to s. 4(1) (a) of the Identity Documents Act 2010 and s. 25(1) (a) of the Identity Cards Act 2006. E was apprehended on a coach bound for France and in possession of a forged passport. The UKBA under the NRM had made a decision that they were victims of sexual exploitation and trafficking. These four appeals were allowed the court accepting that if the prosecution had known the facts of their trafficking and the time they would not have been prosecuted. Thus where Article 26 is not applied because the facts are not fully known until after a trial the appeal mechanism is the only safeguard.
It is further to be noted that possession of forged documents in circumstances of trafficking and slavery is frequently the index offence proceeded with . The case of R v LZ [2012]​[92]​  (​https:​/​​/​www.lexisnexis.com​/​uk​/​legal​/​search​/​enhRunRemoteLink.do?A=0.4935675558317364&service=citation&langcountry=GB&backKey=20_T24714001561&linkInfo=F%23GB%23EWCACRIM%23sel1%252012%25page%251867%25year%252012%25&ersKey=23_T24713977483" \t "_parent​) is also of relevance where the Court of Appeal in quashing the conviction stated:
27.     The position of the Crown on this appeal can be summarised as follows: (1) It accepts that Mrs LZ was trafficked into the UK. (2) Had the facts that are now known about Mrs LZ been known to the CPS at the time that it was considering whether or not to prosecute Mrs LZ for the false passport offence, it would have come to the conclusion that it was not in the public interest to prosecute her. The reason for that is that it would have concluded that she was acting under compulsion in circumstances such that it was not in the public interest to prosecute her for that offence.


The essentialness of involuntariness
	The following two cases illustrate the need for factual demonstration of involuntariness as a requirement to effect any defence in such cases and is relevant to interpreting the s.45 MSA defence. In R v N; R v E [2012]​[93]​ two youths  involved in cannabis production pleaded guilty to offences regarding the production of a controlled class B drug.The Court of Appeal held that the youths had not been compelled, and that the CPS had properly considered Article 26 in exercising its discretion to prosecute. In following R v LM and Others [2010] the court rejected the appellant’s submission “[12]…that once it is demonstrated that an individual has been or may have been trafficked, then he or she should not be prosecuted for crimes committed within that context.” Without a doubt the conditions in these factories for both defendants were miserable. In the case of N counsel investigated a possible duress defence but decided there was insufficient evidence and instead mitigated on the basis that owing to his age and illegal status in the United Kingdom he was both vulnerable and susceptible to the influence of older peers, and felt trapped and fearful of trying to escape. In upholding  the conviction the Court of Appeal said [91] “Having considered all the fresh material, the evidence which suggests that the appellant was, in the word used in Article 26 “compelled” to work in these conditions is, at best from his point of view, nebulous.” In the case of the second appellant, Crown counsel said the appellant could not be described as a trafficked person as he was found with cash on him, a mobile phone and credit for use and provided with groceries. The conviction was upheld although sentence was reduced in both cases on account of the age of the appellants. 
The case of R v Oseyomwabor (Precious) [2012]​[94]​ also demonstrates that being trafficked does not, and will not, automatically provide a shield against prosecution in circumstances where a defendant has committed offences voluntarily. The defendant pleaded guilty to possession of false identity documents with intent and was convicted after a trial of assisting unlawful immigration to a Member State. The offence came to light following an  investigation into a sham marriage between a Dutch national (the wife calling herself Jennifer Wijman) and a Nigerian national (the husband).  Both convictions were upheld. The Recorder’s summing up was cited by the Court of Appeal [14]: 
The circumstances of your entry into this country, accepting the Poppy report on the face of it, I accept was unpleasant as you were for the first few months of your life here in extreme circumstances in August 2006. However, you managed to escape from the clutches of [Gide], but did not go to the authorities; you chose to remain here illegally. These offences took place some four years later, after you had escaped from him. 
She was referred to the Poppy Project after being remanded in custody as a result of her arrest. Certainly Oseyomwabor lived a miserable and impoverished life. She was born in Benin, West Africa, in 1980 and lived in exploitative conditions with a family. She   met a Nigerian man who mistreated her brought her to the United Kingdom became violent and forced her into prostitution. She freed herself from this man and subsequently she came under the control of other men “who used her for their own purposes”. The Court of Appeal reiterated the principle held in LM, MB, DG, BT, YT v The Queen [2010] that trafficking would not provide blanket immunity in cases where a defendant had freed themselves  (as she appears to have done from her original trafficker) and then later decided not to inform police. 

Reasonable but compelled subjects and realistic alternatives
Whether a person has been compelled and is acting involuntarily will be assessed by looking at the fortitude requirement and whether there was any realistic alternative open to the person other that doing the criminal act. The objective requirement of reasonableness is crafted with a further layering requiring there to be “no realistic alternative to doing that act” as set out in s. 45 1 (d) MSA “a reasonable person in the same situation as the person and having the person’s relevant characteristics would have no realistic alternative to doing that act.”​[95]​ It surely is a contradiction to expect a trafficked person in fear to demonstrate fortitude. More likely, the trafficked victim is a person whose will has been overborne, who has been ground down and who is vulnerable and compliant. In these circumstances the courts and the fact finders are the judges of whether it is objectively reasonable that a person was compelled to act as they did. But as in other areas of criminal law the fearful subject is nonetheless required to behave reasonably and in their state of fear weigh their response, opportunity to resist, and opportunities for escape. 
Realistic alternatives and reasonableness are constructs imagined in a social world, and by those whose experience is often outside the world of the person whose behavior is under scrutiny. For example, Lord Wheatley in the case of June Greig who killed her violent husband clearly took the view that she had alternatives, “There are various expedients open to a woman subjected to rough treatment by her husband, but a licence to kill is not one of them. There is no doubt that this was a deliberate and intentional killing, and provocation in law was at most minimal. Even at the last moment when she was given an opportunity to leave the house, she rejected the offer and opted for the fatal course.”​[96]​  Further misunderstanding and stereotypes abound as Loveless in her critique on duress pointed out that the law too readily assumes that for example an otherwise robust woman could not be coerced.​[97]​ Edwards found in a review of battered woman syndrome in homicide cases in the US that her claims of being under duress were considerably weakened when she did not fit the stereotype of a battered woman.​[98]​ Moreover, as the Modern Slavery Group has recommended​[99]​  where the trafficked victim is fearful and decides not to engage with the criminal justice system, police, prosecutors and the courts should apply the evidential provisions of CJA 2003 regarding admissibility of hearsay. 


Cultural factors in being compelled
	In circumstances of slavery and trafficking the courts and fact finders will be required to adjudicate on circumstances totally outside their cultural understanding. Laird​[100]​  in his summary of the Act and in his analysis of van Dao​[101]​ (an appeal against a conviction for cannabis cultivation and false imprisonment) demonstrates this incomprehension. In this case a plea of duress failed because the appellant had the key to the premises and technically could come and go as he pleased. 
In situations of fear and stress, action or inaction may not appear reasonable to the outsider. It is well documented that victims of trafficking do not behave reasonably, they do not speak to their lawyers when it may assist them to do so (see above), and they remain silent because of fear. 
Finally, one of the areas which will certainly require a cultural expert to speak to the matter of compulsion since the circumstances are outside the understanding of the court and fact finders is when the court is tasked to consider the reasonable person of compulsion and the question of realistic alternatives where witchcraft and juju curses have been used to compel victims to commit crimes. It is recognised that juju and witchcraft is a significant factor in trafficking. As explained by the charity Anti Trafficking Consultants​[102]​ 
“Using the ever-binding power of the Juju, instructions can be given to individuals to complete acts or instructions. In the case of human trafficking although the controller will be many miles away the belief by the victim that she is being watched is so powerful she will feel compelled to comply with instructions, to do otherwise would risk death.” ​[103]​ 
The special vulnerability of these victims was highlighted in the Report of the Modern Slavery Bill Evidence Review which recommended “Where a witness has been subjected to witchcraft, juju or other forms or ritual anywhere in the world the defence should not be allowed to cross examine the witness on this matter without the consent of the judge.”​[104]​ There is much evidence of the use of this means to compel. For example, in R v Anthony Harrison [2012]​[105]​ a sentence of 20 years was upheld for trafficking young women out of the UK to work as prostitutes in Spain and Greece. One of the victims said she had been brought up as a member of her uncle's family in Nigeria, and that when she was 16 she was forced to take part in rituals, made to work as a prostitute and sent to the UK. Because of fear of ‘the ritual’ she had undergone she was terrorised into submission, co-operation and silence. The ritual included  being stripped, shaved, slashed with a razor, tied up, bound, closed in a coffin and told by the ‘juju priest’ that he could access her soul at any time and kill her from within. There are several further unreported cases before the Crown Courts. Osezua Osolase (2012)​[106]​ operated a child sex trafficking ring and sent his victims to Spain and Italy to work as prostitutes. One of the three victims, was aged 14.  Osolase was found guilty of five counts of trafficking for sexual exploitation, one count of rape and one count of sexual activity with a child. He used ‘juju rituals’ to force their compliance.  Judge Adele Williams: said “You were dealing in exploitation and misery and degradation. You have been convicted on clear and compelling evidence of trafficking two girls in and out of the UK.” ​[107]​  In 2013, Gloria Benjamin was convicted of forcing a young girl into prostitution by using a juju curse.​[108]​ The victim was made to sleep with four men a day after being brought over by Nigerian traffickers. The girl was cut on her back and chest and had black powder rubbed into the wounds in juju rituals to force her compliance. In 2016, Lizzy Idahosa was convicted of trafficking and sentenced to eight years imprisonment. She had promised that young girls could come to Europe seek work and be re united with relatives but they were forced to work in brothels in Brighton and across the South of England. They were coerced with juju curses. Judge Tom Crowther QC said “These women were taken in by the promises made of a better life. To reinforce these promises you made sure that each one was put through a juju ceremony where they were stripped, cut, forced to eat raw snails and drink foul water…The impact of such a ritual would have been profound - they were living in mortal terror.”​[109]​ In August 2016, Franca Asemota (the trafficker R v C (HB) and ors [2014]​[110]​  was convicted of trafficking and jailed for 22 years she trafficked women from Africa to the UK and then on to Europe keeping them in subjugation and fear with juju curses and witchcraft.​[111]​
The circumstances in such cases and the victim/defendants response to them are to be assessed against the artificiality of the normative construct of the reasonable person of criminal law  and the legal construction of what is a realistic alternative when considering the question of whether a victim/defendant is a genuine victim of trafficking. 

Conclusion 
	In conclusion whilst the offence of coercion s.76 SCA and defence of compulsion s.45 MCA may be noble attempts to deal with two rampant mischiefs their shortcomings are legion. If the offence of control and coercion is to be effected a wholesale programme of training of the statutory authorities and legal representatives needs to be urgently undertaken. The mere existence of the provision will not compensate for the ingrained conditioning of fact finders who may consider that under certain circumstances men are entitled to coerce. The effectiveness of this provision will depend on the robustness of police and prosecutors with regard to investigating, case building and pressing charges with regard to the offence of coercion and using other evidential provisions for example hearsay s.116, and s.118 CJA 2003,in order to ensure such cases  are proceeded with.  
In circumstances of trafficking the courts and fact finders will have difficulty in understanding the circumstances of entrapment as they apply their own constructions of reasonableness from within a world with which they are familiar. With regard to trafficking, slavery and compulsion it is for competent authorities to act on the guidance given by the Court of Appeal with regard to implementing Article 26 whose sentiment of non-prosecution is now further supported in statute where victim/offenders commit crimes under compulsion.Whilst this new development is part of a wider strategy to protect victims of slavery and trafficking from being prosecuted, for some of the offences committed under compulsion, but excluded, it is severely limited. The Schedule 4 excluded offences is open to amendment by the Secretary of State under s. 45(8) MCA and it is urged that some of the criminal offences which are so inextricably linked to situations of slavery and trafficking are removed forthwith. It is also suggested that if the Article 26 provision is properly implemented only those cases where trafficking circumstances are made known after a trial has been commenced will require the application of s. 45 MCA​[112]​. But then since the circumstances to which the defence can be applied is extremely limited the spirit of Article 26 will be undermined. Certainly the course adopted for the defence should continue to follow the Lord Justice Hughes’ guidance in LM.​[113]​
Finally, the s. 45 MCA privileges particular victim/offenders of slavery and trafficking setting them apart from victim/offenders in other circumstances, domestic violence for example. Domestic violence victims find themselves in circumstances where they too are compelled to commit criminal offences​[114]​, - the very victims Baroness Hale alluded to in Hasan,​[115]​ and their plight needs now to be urgently addressed.



END
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